**Individual reasons to act in collective action problems**

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| *Very strong reasons having to do with collective action*  *Very weak (to non-existent) reasons having to do with collective action* | Judges' duties to adhere in suboptimal result cases - which have to do with maintaining a consistent and well functioning justice system and maintaining order in society - always override their reasons to deviate. (x3)  The justice system treats defendants, in general, unjustly. A defense attorney has reasons, having to do with this general, systematic injustices, to protect their clients; the reasons to protect the client are not merely about what is good or bad for that particular defendant. The reasons stemming from these systematic injustices are more important than all other relevant reasons, making it always permissible to defend the client in an effective (but still legal) way.  If a group causes some harm (e.g. mimetic failure or some kind of oppression), then one has moral reasons to not be part of the group. The weight of these reasons is proportionate to the size of the harm the group causes together. So, for judges, if the actual amount of mimetic failure is more harmful than the actual amount of oppression, one should adhere rather than deviate.  Judges have strong moral obligations to deviate in sub-optimal result cases. This is because adherence in these cases is a form of oppression, and the duty to avoid oppression is an extremely strong one.  Judges have reasons to adhere in sub-optimal result cases, but only when deviation would make them complicit in some harm. These reasons are very weak and overridden by almost any other prima facie duty.  When a judge acts in the context of a collective action problem (e.g. involving mimetic failure, or systemic injustice), they only have moral reasons to act if their action makes a difference to the amount of harm that occurs. |

**Group moral obligations**

The United States justice system, as an organization, has moral obligations due to its ability to exercise its own will and to hold beliefs. Because the department is both not an actual person and holds great power, the department holds different moral obligations than individuals, and this different moral obligation would be greater due to the power the entity holds.

There are group moral reasons in legal contexts, which derive from the collective goal of the group. As such, groups have moral obligations in contexts that are relevant to the collective goal of the group. If the moral reasons are irrelevant to the collective goal of the group, then the group has no obligation to adhere to those reasons. These collective obligations do not generate reasons for individuals, as individuals could not achieve the collective goal without the collective. The only reasons that apply to individuals are reasons that pertain to the outcomes of their actions.

There are no real moral obligations on legal organizations. All seeming group obligations can be explained entirely in terms of obligations on individuals.

Legal organization do not have moral obligations beyond the sum of their individuals. This is because each action of the “group” can be attributed to a specific individual within the group, and so there are no actions which cannot be explained by the individuals that contributed to the resulting actions. So, moral obligations lie upon the individuals within a group, not upon the group its self.